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This paper provides an analysis of the corruption problem in public organizations. It
distinguishes between two types of corruption (individual/organized) and crime (bribe
for a legal/illegal application), and between two occasions (before/after detection) for
partial and full collusion. The integrated supervision procedure, where monitoring and
review are centralized, displays higher individual corruption but a lower risk of orga-
nized corruption than the alternative, separated supervision procedure. Higher penal-
ties and bribes, and lower rewards to supervisors, increase the risk of all types of
collusion under both procedures. A trade-off is involved in the choice of the supervision
procedure and penalties: Reducing individual corruption brings about a higher risk of
organized corruption. © 1998 by Elsevier Science Inc.
I. Introduction
Corruption is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon. It can be manifest at the
individual level as an isolated event and at the group level in an organized and
systematized form. It can involve various types of crimes ranging from the trivial
acceptance of ‘‘speed money’’ to the illegal sale of land by government officials
administering a land reform. An organization may display partial collusion, as supervi-
sors may be internally bribed to cover up a specific type of crime upon its detection.
Determinants of individual corrupt incentives are the size of the private benefit, the
structure of the organization, its rules, distribution of tasks, and review procedures.
Many social scientists have acknowledged the importance of organizational and eco-
nomic influences, but few (some of whom are mentioned below) have examined these
factors formally. The lack of satisfactory formal models of public bureaucracies and
supervision procedures impedes our understanding of the many organizational aspects
of corruption. The present paper takes a step in this direction.
What is the relationship between supervision procedures and the level, type, and
scope of corruption? How effective are sanctions and rewards to successful supervision
in fighting off various types of corruption? Do these instruments generate any trade-off
between one type of corruption and another? When does a better supervision technol-
ogy mitigate corruption; and when does it not? I address these questions in a simple
model where a street-level bureaucrat who is presented with an opportunity to reap a
private corrupt benefit plays against a supervision system. I distinguish between external
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(individual) and internal (organized) types of corruption, and thus I allow for the
possibility of collusion between the supervisors and the street-level bureaucrat. I also
distinguish between types of internal corruption, according to its timing (before and
after detection of a bribe) and according to the crime involved. I consider two types of
potential crimes for the bureaucrat: a rather trivial case of bribe for (say, speeding up)
a legal application; and a bribe for processing an illegal application. I compare the
effectiveness of two supervisory procedures in light of these distinctions. Under ‘‘inte-
grated supervision,’’ review and active monitoring are performed by the same agent;
under ‘‘separated supervision,’’ they are performed by two distinct agents.
Formal studies of corruption in organizations build on two branches of literature, the
economics of crime and law enforcement, and principal–agent relationships. I borrow
from Becker (1968) the basic idea that incentives to engage in crime depend on the
expected rewards and, because crime is inherently risky, the probability of being caught
and convicted. Becker and Stigler (1974) were first to introduce a principal–agent
model of corruption; Banfield (1975) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) have further ex-
tended their analysis. The major development in the second branch of literature that is
relevant here is the extension of the classic principal–agent framework to include chains
of principal–agent relationships, with pioneering papers by Tirole (1986, 1992) and
Laffont (1990). The new principal–supervisor–agent paradigm stimulated many papers
exploring various aspects of private organizations with possible collusion among the
members.1 However, existing models of private organizations shed little light on the
corruption problem, owing to the differences and complexities of public bureaucra-
cies.2 Cadot (1987) discusses bribery but does not consider the problem of internal
corruption. Basu et al. (1992) come closest to our analysis in that they consider the
possibility of internal bribery. None of these papers endogenize the supervision system;
they thus step aside the problem of motivating the supervisors. They treat the act of
bribery as a homogeneous crime, and hence they do not allow for partial collusion. Nor
do they distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post occasions for collusion.3
What I call external corruption is an individual, isolated act of corruption that occurs in
the transaction between the client and the street-level bureaucrat. Typical examples are
extortion and bribes. Internal corruption, on the other hand, is a form of collusion
transforming the organization into an internal market of systematized sharing of
corrupt proceeds.4 Clearly, a public organization with full internal corruption will
exhibit full external corruption. To cope with external corruption the organization may
implement active monitoring and hierarchical review, but these measures can easily
1See, for example, Kofman and Lawarrée (1993).
2The major difference between public and private organizations lies at the level of objectives; public organizations
lack clear goals. This, of course, has implications for the incentives (see also note 10). Economic theorists’ limited
attention to the study of decision making, supervision, and enforcement in public bureaucracies and government has
recently been emphasized by Tirole (1994); his paper is rich in ideas for future theoretical research in this field.
3Manion (1996) and Bac (1996a, 1996b) include most of these features but do not distinguish between legal and
illegal applications, hence they do not address the impact of supervision and review systems on the control of
corruption.
4Examples of internal corruption in public bureaucracies abound. In his case study of corruption in the Hong Kong
police force during the 1960s and 1970s, Klitgaart (1988) reports that officials collected money from drug and
gambling dens, a sizeable sum of which was transferred to higher ranking officials. He writes: ‘‘About HK$65,000 was
collected each month in this fashion, and the sum was divided in an organized and hierarchical way,’’ ranging from
HK$50 for a constable to the sizeable sum of HK$4000 for the senior superintendent. Another—rather extreme—
example of internal corruption is reported by Morris (1991) in Mexico, where a group of police in 1983 was discovered
operating a large auto theft and bank robbery ring.
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backfire if they generate a scope for internal corruption. There are, of course, degrees
of internal corruption, according to the scope and coverage of the collusive agreement.
The organization may only exhibit partial internal corruption involving certain types of
corrupt actions; for example, the supervisors may be internally bribed for not reporting
specific types of bribes. I will show that such partial internal corruption occurs ex-post
(upon detection), whereas full internal corruption occurs ex-ante.
From the legal point of view, there is no well-defined standard crime of corruption.5
Formal and informal sanctions that apply, for instance, to a bribe for speeding up the
process of paying taxes differ substantially from those for the rather blatant crime of
accepting bribes for an illegal land sale. I assume differential sanctions for the two types
of crimes. Breaking the crime of corruption into its elements, I investigate the impact
of sanctions, supervisory rewards, and review procedures on the incentives to accept a
bribe for a client’s legal or illegal application.6
Two variants of a two-stage approval/rejection supervision procedure are studied.
The first stage consists of active monitoring of the street-level bureaucrat; in the second
stage the application is reviewed. The probability of detection in both monitoring and
review stages of supervision is endogenous. The review process checks the legal status of
the application, thus a bribe on a legal application can be detected only through
monitoring. The integrated supervision procedure has a single supervisor who works in
both stages, i.e., who monitors and reviews the street-level bureaucrat. The separated
supervision procedure has two supervisors; the second reviews the decision made by the
first, who in turn monitors the street-level bureaucrat.
The paper presents a set of results that hold under both supervision procedures,
concerning the impact of sanctions and rewards on monitoring, review, and expected
level of corruption. Bureaucracies that provide higher rewards to their supervisors will
induce closer supervision and lower levels of all types of corruption. Higher penalties
have no direct impact on supervision incentives but produce a similar desirable effect
on external corruption. However, higher penalties increase the bureaucrat’s willingness
to pay for safely accepting bribes, and hence they enlarge the scope for all types of
collusion, ex-post, ex-ante, partial, and full. Excessively high penalties can thus generate
full internal (hence, external) corruption, quite the opposite of what conventional
wisdom suggests.
The second set of results concerns the comparative effectiveness of the two supervi-
sion procedures in deterring corruption. I find that the separated supervision proce-
dure is more effective in reducing external corruption but displays a larger scope for
ex-ante full internal corruption. The choice of the supervision procedure, as for that of
the penalties, presents a delicate trade-off. Separating review from active monitoring
(assigning review of applications to a second supervisor) generates an externality in the
system: It brings in the possibility of punishing the first supervisor if he fails to detect an
illegal application detected by the second. It also induces competition between the
supervisors for the reward from a successful bribe report on an illegal application. As a
result, monitoring incentives are much stronger and expected external corruption is
5In the words of a legal scholar, Lowenstein (1985), ‘‘ . . . the crime of bribery is the core of a series of concentric
circles representing the degrees of impropriety in official behavior.’’ See also Ruff (1977) for problems caused by
definitional difficulties in the enforcement of corruption laws.
6To my knowledge, the only theoretical study that draws the ‘‘legal/illegal application’’ distinction is Rose-
Ackerman (1978). Though she provides a thorough analysis of the pros and cons of corruption based on economic first
principles, her analysis lacks a rigorous game-theoretic framework.
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lower under the separated supervision procedure. However, given the potential benefits
from collusion, the same externality reduces equilibrium payoffs in the system and
makes internal corruption more attractive. Introducing sequential competition in su-
pervision may thus generate higher (indeed, full) corruption instead of reducing it. The
trade-off between external corruption and the risk of internal corruption should be an
important consideration in choosing between integrated/separated supervision proce-
dures. This choice bears a further, practical importance because other parameters
(rewards, penalties) that ideally should be adjusted to mitigate internal corruption in
public bureaucracies are not fully adjustable.
I identify three potential cases of partial internal corruption that occur upon detec-
tion if the supervisor’s reward from reporting falls short of the offer (or the bargained
transfer) he receives for covering up the bribe. The surplus that can be shared in turn
depends on the sizes of bribes and potential penalties. For a bribe from a legally
qualified applicant that is detected during the monitoring process, the two supervision
procedures produce the same collusion-proofness constraint: The lower the supervi-
sor’s reward, or the larger the bribe and the penalty, the higher is the risk of ex-post
collusion. There are two cases of ex-post partial internal corruption upon detection of an
illegal application. If detection occurs during the monitoring process, collusion be-
tween the bureaucrat and the supervisor is less likely under the separated supervision
procedure because the application will be reviewed by the second supervisor. On the
other hand, the integrated supervision procedure is less likely to generate collusion
upon detection in the review process. The reason is simple: Only the street-level
bureaucrat can be punished under the integrated procedure, as opposed to two officials
(the bureaucrat and the first supervisor) under the separated procedure. Obviously, the
two officials together can offer a larger bribe to cover up the detected crime.
The next section describes the model and discusses its basic features. Sections III and
IV study respectively the noncooperative equilibria and internal corruption possibilities
under the integrated supervision procedure. Sections V and VI examine the separated
supervision procedure and contrast the results with those of Sections III and IV. Section
VII concludes.
II. A Model of Public Bureaucracy
I consider two variants of a simple model of public bureaucracy with risk-neutral
individuals. The first is the star hierarchy, which includes two individuals, a street-level
bureaucrat called the agent (A) and a supervisor (S) who performs two tasks: active
monitoring and reviewing. The second hierarchy is called the hat hierarchy, where
review and active monitoring are done separately by two supervisors. The two supervi-
sory functions are thus ‘‘integrated’’ in the star hierarchy and ‘‘separated’’ in the hat
hierarchy. I begin with a description of the sequence of events in the star hierarchy; the
corresponding game tree (excluding the possibility of ex-ante collusion) is depicted in
Figure 1.
In the first stage of the supervision game agent A meets a client whose application can
be of two types: a legal application with probability a and an illegal application with
probability 1 2 a. Only the agent observes the legal status of the application, but the
value of a is common knowledge.7 A’s duty is to process the legal application and to
7A request for a service or benefit to which the client is legally entitled is a legal application; otherwise, it is an illegal
application. For example, a developer seeking approval for a structure in an urban area has a legal application if the
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reject the illegal application. Instead of processing the legal application (bL 5 0), A may
try extracting a bribe of L from the client (bL 5 1). Similarly, when A is presented with
an illegal application, instead of rejecting it on the spot he may again try extracting a
bribe, this time of value Z, for processing the application. The bribes can be interpreted
planned structure accords with the existing laws and regulations; a passport request is also a legal application if the
applicant is legally qualified (e.g., citizenship, age, and criminal record). Offering a bribe for passing a prohibited good
through customs is an illegal application.
FIG. 1. The supervision game in the star hierarchy.
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as the client’s maximum willingness to pay for the agent’s corrupt service.8 I assume L ,
Z and denote by bZ the probability that the agent assigns to accepting this bribe.
The agent and his supervisor S first play a monitoring game: simultaneously with A’s
choice of bL or bZ, S chooses a monitoring effort m. The marginal cost of supervision
effort (be it for monitoring or review) is assumed constant for simplicity and is denoted
by c. With probability m(m), S successfully monitors A and detects the bribe if bL 5 1 or
bZ 5 1 is realized. We assume that m: R
13 [0, 1] is strictly concave and differentiable,
with m9(m)3 ` as m3 0.9 If A is caught taking a bribe for a legal (respectively, illegal)
application, he is fined fL (respectively, fZ). On the other hand, the supervisor S obtains
a reward worth pL (respectively, pZ) if he successfully documents a bribe for a legal
(respectively, illegal) application. Detection of a bribe ends the game. A may try to bribe
S to avoid the fine; an agreement to this effect is called partial ex-post collusion.
If monitoring fails, the game proceeds to a second stage where only S moves. S’s
choice in this stage consists of a review effort r, which costs him cr. Success in review is
also stochastic. With probability r(r) review is successful, which means that S is able to
see whether the application is legal or illegal. I assume that r:R1 3 [0, 1] is strictly
concave and differentiable, with r9(r) 3 0 as r 3 0. If S detects and reports an illegal
application, A is fined fZ and S receives the reward pZ. The other option for S upon his
detection is to collude with A.
Multistage supervision procedures are widely used in public organizations. The
two-stage procedure we have described above provides a double-checking mechanism
for the illegal application, but the only occasion in which a bribe for a legal application
can be detected is the first stage, through active monitoring by S. Monitoring thus
should be understood as a close inspection of the agent during his decision-making
process; review is an examination of the written application. Effective supervision in
public organizations can be induced with the carrot of rewards for successful supervisors
who report, and the stick of fines for those who fail to or deliberately do not report
corrupt behavior.10 The stick can be used to the extent that alternative reliable sources
of information are available. Outside whistleblowers (the clients themselves and the
media) are examples of such sources. For simplicity, I assumed that the agent can safely
accept bribes in the absence of supervision. I consider, however, an internal source of
information. In the hat hierarchy, where review is assigned to a second supervisor, it is
possible to punish the first supervisor if the second detects and reports an illegal
application. As for the rewards to successful supervision, they are mostly nonmonetary
in public organizations, such as improved career expectations, travel, favorable public-
8I have chosen not to represent the client’s behavior explicitly in the model to keep the analysis simple. The relevant
consideration for the client who bribes the street-level bureaucrat is the potential trouble from detection. This can be
captured by lower values of L and Z in the model, for the client’s expected benefit from (hence, his willingness to pay
for) the bureaucrat’s corrupt service is lower. Whether the organization is internally corrupt would, however, make a
difference, for the client’s willingness to pay because in that case the client would face no risk of detection, hence no
potential trouble. The analysis would go through by assuming two different values of bribes, LH and LL, the first being
for an internally corrupt organization and higher than LL, the bribe when the organization displays no internal
corruption.
9A ‘‘prime’’ denotes a partial derivative throughout the paper.
10Incentive systems in public organizations are relatively ineffective due to a host of reasons including difficulties
involved in measuring individual performance. Consider for instance the problem of evaluating the performance of a
police department. For another public organization, Wilson (1989) writes: ‘‘ . . . prisons have rules, but the ends that
these rules should serve are unclear—custody? security? self-governance, or rehabilitation?’’
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ity, and simple praise. In the model, these rewards are represented by pL and pZ.
Nothing is assumed about the relative sizes of pZ and pL.
11
Besides appropriate supervisory incentives, the prevention of corruption requires
punishments for illicit behavior. Public organizations’ ability to raise punishments is
constrained by internal regulations and the external legal environment (for example,
local service laws). The list may include prison sentences and fines, or tarnishing the
names of corrupt officials, which affects credit ranking, professional license, or later job
prospects. But surprisingly often the only effective punishment for even a severe crime
is dismissal. The model has differential punishments for the two types of crimes, for a
good reason: Processing an illegal application involves, besides the incidence of bribe,
an additional violation of law whose social cost is likely to be higher than a trivial speed
money. In characterizing the noncooperative equilibria I will assume Z/fZ . L/fL: The
bribe/fine ratio is higher for the illegal application. This assumption, to which I refer
as the case of ‘‘relatively more attractive illegal application,’’ economizes on space by
reducing the number of potential noncooperative equilibria from nine to six; it has no
further relevant implications.
The possibility of internal corruption is ignored below, until Section IV. Considering
the star hierarchy, let wA be A’s wage, and suppose first that he receives a legal
application. If A accepts the bribe, there are two possibilities: He will be monitored
successfully with probability m(m) and fined, which yields the payoff wA 2 fL. If he is not
detected, he gets the payoff wA 1 L. So A’s expected payoff when he receives a legal
application is
EU*A~L! 5 bL@~1 2 m~m!!~wA 1 L! 1 m~m!~wA 2 fL !# 1 ~1 2 bL!wA,
which simplifies to
EU*A~L! 5 bL@L 2 m~m!~L 1 fL!# 1 wA.
Thus, given a monitoring effort m, A’s best reply is:















Acceptance of a bribe for an illegal application will go undetected with probability
(1 2 m(m))(1 2 r(r)) but will be detected with probability m(m) 1 (1 2 m(m))r(r). This
yields the expected payoff
11A perhaps obvious but important difference between salaries and rewards in terms of their effect on incentives
should be stressed. It is often argued that unreasonably low salaries compel the officials to be corrupt, bribes replacing
pay hikes. In contrast with efficiency wage models, here a salary increase makes no difference to corrupt incentives at
the margin. Salaries have an impact on the scope for internal corruption if sanctions include the loss of a job, as I show
in section V.
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EU*A~Z! 5 bZ $~1 2 m~m!!~1 2 r~r!!~wA 1 Z! 1 @m~m! 1 ~1 2 m~m!!r~r!#
~wA 2 fZ !% 1 ~1 2 bZ !wA,
which simplifies to
EU*A~Z! 5 bZ$~1 2 m~m!!~1 2 r~r!! Z 2 @m~m! 1 ~1 2 m~m!!r~r!# fZ % 1 wA.
Hence, A’s best reply b*Z(m) to S9s monitoring and review efforts can be written as









where K 5 [Z 2 r(r)(Z 1 fZ)]/[(Z 1 fZ)(1 2 r(r))]. A’s ex-ante (before he receives the
application) expected payoff is EU*A 5 aEU*A(L) 1 (1 2 a)EU*A(Z).
Consider now the supervisor’s two-stage decision problem. S will review only if
monitoring fails. In that event, S’s expected payoff from reviewing is r(r)[(1 2 a)bZpZ]
2 cr. Thus, his expected payoff at the beginning of the monitoring game can be written
as
EU*S 5 m~m!@abL pL 1 ~1 2 a!bZ pZ 2 mc# 1 ~1 2 m~m!!@~1 2 a!bZ pZ r~r!
2 ~m 1 r!c# 1 wS.
A noncooperative (Nash) equilibrium of the supervision game in the star hierarchy
is a collection of strategies {b*L, b*Z, m*, r*} defined in the obvious way. Strategies must
be best replies to each other: b*L and b*Z must satisfy equations (1) and (2), respectively,
whereas m* and r* must satisfy, respectively,
m9~m*!@ab*LpL 1 ~1 2 a!b*ZpZ~1 2 r~r*!! 1 cr*# 5 c, (3)
r9~r*!~1 2 a!b*ZpZ 5 c. (4)
Recall that the optimality condition for r* in equation (4) applies only if monitoring is
not successful, i.e., if m 5 0 is realized (see Figure 1). I investigate below the impact of
rewards and fines on the noncooperative equilibrium of the star hierarchy.
III. Equilibrium Analysis in the Star Hierarchy
The Impact of Rewards
In characterizing equilibria I assume that the illegal application is relatively more
attractive. In the absence of this assumption the analysis proceeds similarly but is slightly
more complex as one has to consider a larger number of potential cases. I start with a
lemma:
LEMMA: If Z/fZ . L/fL, the supervision game has no equilibria in which b*Z 5 0, no matter
the values of pL and pZ.
PROOF: Suppose that there is an equilibrium where b*Z 5 0. By equation (4), r* 5 0 in such
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which implies ZfL ¶ LfZ and contradicts the assumption.
Thus, ruling out b*Z 5 0, the supervision game may exhibit six types of equilibria
according to whether the pair (b*L, b*Z) involves combinations of pure and/or mixed
strategies. Proposition 1 shows that the effect of changing pL and pZ on equilibrium
strategies depends on the type of equilibrium; pL is more effective in reducing b*L,
whereas pZ is more effective on reducing b*Z. I will refer to the equilibrium in case
(1) of Proposition 1 as a type-(1) equilibrium, case (2) as a type-(2) equilibrium, and so
forth.
PROPOSITION 1: Comparative statics applied to equilibrium conditions are summarized in Table 1.
The proof consists of lengthy algebraic manipulations of total differentiation of
equilibrium conditions; it is omitted. I highlight below some common features of
equilibria according to these comparative statics results. A small increase in the reward
for detecting a bribe on a legal application induces a higher monitoring effort in
equilibria where monitoring is ineffective; that is, dm*/dpL . 0 whenever b*L 5 1. But
when monitoring is effective (b*L { [0, 1]), the only impact of increasing pL is to reduce
b*L. The equilibrium review effort r*, on the other hand, is independent of pL except in
type-(6) equilibria where it is ‘‘crowded out’’ by the higher monitoring effort m*. As for
the impact of a small increase in pZ, it stimulates monitoring if supervision is ineffective
on illegal applications (b*Z 5 1), except in a type-(2) equilibrium where b*L { (0, 1). The
review effort increases with pZ if and only if b*Z 5 1, and it remains constant if b*Z { (0,
1). Thus, in equilibria of types (4), (5), and (6), a higher pZ causes a reduction in b*Z.
To provide further intuition on the workings of the model, I consider the following
exercise, which consists of increasing pZ for fixed values of pL. To begin with, suppose
that pL is sufficiently low and pZ 5 0. This means, through the equilibrium conditions
in equations (1) and (4), that m(m*) , L/(L 1 fL) and r* 5 0, hence b*L 5 b*Z 5 1: The
equilibrium is of type (1), where monitoring is positive but ineffective, and the appli-
cation is not reviewed. A strictly positive pZ will activate the review process and, by part
(1) of Proposition 1, both monitoring (m*) and review efforts (r*) will rise. Two cases
may arise depending on the initial level of pL. If pL is low enough, higher pZ may,
through increases in m* and r*, eventually lead to an equilibrium in which b*L 5 b*Z 5
1 with
Z 2 r~r*!~Z 1 fZ!





At this point, r* and m* are such that A is indifferent to a bribe for the illegal application
but strictly prefers it for the legal application. The intuition is that because pL is too low

















(1) b*L 5 b*Z 5 1 (1) (1) 0 (1) 0 0 0 0
(2) b*L { (0, 1), b*Z 5 1 0 0 0 (1) (2) (2) 0 0
(3) b*L 5 0, b*Z 5 1 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 0 0 0
(4) b*L 5 0, b*Z { (0, 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (2)
(5) b*L{(0, 1), b*Z { (0, 1) 0 0 0 0 (2) 0 0 (2)
(6) b*L 5 1, b*Z { (0, 1) (1) 0 (2) 0 0 0 (2) (2)
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with respect to pZ, S concentrates his effort on detecting the illegal application through
monitoring and reviewing, as a result the equilibrium switches to a type (6). From that
point on, higher pZ will keep decreasing b*Z toward zero but will leave all other strategies
unchanged. This case, corresponding to a low level of pL, is depicted in Figure 2. Now,
if pL is not too low, increasing pZ may lead to the border between type-(1) and type-(2)
equilibria where b*L 5 b*Z 5 1 and
Z 2 r~r*!~Z 1 fZ!





A becomes indifferent between bL 5 0 and bL 5 1 (chooses b*L 5 1 in this particular
border equilibrium), but he strictly prefers b*Z 5 1. Because pL is higher than in the case
considered in Figure 2, to the same level of pZ corresponds a higher monitoring effort
that becomes effective on A’s decision about the bribe for a legal application. Increasing
pZ will switch the equilibrium to a type-(2) equilibrium where S’s optimal review effort
satisfies r9(r*)(1 2 a)pZ 5 c because b*Z 5 1, and r* will be increasing in pZ. But m*, as
determined through equation (3), will not respond (see Figure 3). For if it were to
respond, m(m*) . L/(L 1 fL) would imply b*L 5 0, which in turn would require m to fall
dramatically by condition (3), upsetting the equilibrium. Thus, in a type-(2) equilib-
rium, the only impact of a higher pZ is to reduce b*L. As pZ is increased further, r* will
keep increasing, and eventually a value of pZ will be reached such that the three terms
in equation (5) will be equal to each other. This corresponds to a type-(5) equilibrium
where A hesitates between accepting and rejecting both types of applications. There-
after, increasing pZ will only decrease b*Z as depicted in Figure 3. Another possibility that
FIG. 2. The effect of the reward for detecting the illegal application when pL is low.
110 Scope, timing, and type of corruption
may arise if pL is initially set sufficiently high is that b*L may fall to zero before b*Z becomes
mixed. In this type-(3) equilibrium, an increase in pZ generates increases in both m* and
r* and the equilibrium will at last switch to a type (4). This case is shown in Figure 4.
The integrated two-step supervision procedure with high rewards to successful super-
vision will thus exhibit lower external (and, as I show in Section IV, internal) corrup-
tion. In particular, the reward pZ induces both monitoring and review efforts, and
hence, it is more powerful than pL.
The Impact of Fines
The fines affect noncooperative equilibria only if supervision is effective.
PROPOSITION 2: Consider a type-(5) equilibrium of the star hierarchy where b*L { (0, 1) and
b*Z { (0, 1). In the absence of collusion:
(1) A small increase in fL reduces equilibrium monitoring but increases the review effort. The
agent is less (more) likely to be bribed when he receives a legal (illegal) application;
(2) A small increase in fZ reduces both the review effort and A’s willingness to accept a bribe from
an illegal application. The monitoring effort and A’s acceptance strategy for the legal
application remain unchanged.
PROOF: Consider Part 1. Changes in fL affect equilibria through the agent’s indifference
condition m(m*) 5 L/(L 1 fL). Suppose that m* does not change in response to a small increase
in fL. Then, m(m*) . L/(L 1 fL), which implies b*L 5 0, and the equilibrium condition (3) for
m* will not hold. Clearly, m* should decrease to restore the equality m(m*) 5 L/(L 1 fL).
Differentiating A’s indifference condition for b*Z { (0, 1) given in equation (2) yields






which shows that r* should increase in response to the decrease in m*. From the equilibrium
condition (4) we see that b*Z must also increase. Using these results in equation (3), it follows that
b*L must fall. Part 2 can be proved through similar arguments.
Though small changes in the fines fL and fZ affect the level of corruption only when
equilibrium supervision is effective, large increases in fL and fZ can, of course, transform
ineffective supervision into effective supervision. However, as shown below, including
the possibility of internal corruption may change the picture dramatically.
IV. Internal Corruption in the Star-Hierarchy
S and A may collude on two occasions: ex-ante, before A receives the application, and
ex-post, if A is caught taking a bribe. Ex-ante collusion eliminates accountability com-
pletely, m* 5 r* 5 0, hence it implies full corruption, b*L 5 b*Z 5 1. An obvious necessary
condition for ex-ante collusion between A and S is that the corresponding expected
surplus be positive. This condition is also sufficient if, as I assume, collusive side
contracts are costless to enforce and negotiate.12 The ex-ante collusion-proofness con-
12The way this expected surplus is shared is inconsequential to the analysis. Sufficiency of a positive expected surplus
from collusion is, of course, a strong assumption, but its implications seem somewhat tangential to the main points of
this paper. The magnitude of the costs involved in enforcing and negotiating collusive arrangements depends on the
FIG. 4. The effect of the reward for detecting the illegal application when pL is very large.
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straint then requires EU*S 2 wS Ä aL 1 (1 2 a)Z 2 [EU*A 2 wA]: S9s expected utility from
monitoring and reviewing must exceed A’s ex-ante willingness to pay for safely accepting
bribes. Using the expressions for EU*S and EU*A, this constraint can be written as
apLb*Lm~m*! 1 ~1 2 a! pZb*Z @m~m*! 1 ~1 2 m~m*!!r~r*!# 2 c@r*~1 2 m!
~m*!) 1 m*] > aL 1 (1 2 a)Z 2 ab*L@L 2 m~m*!~L 1 fL!# 2
~1 2 a!b*Z @~1 2 m~m*!!(1 2 r~r*!)Z 2 ~m~m*! 1 ~1 2 m~m*!!r~r*!! fZ#. (6)
The left-hand side of equation (6) represents the expected payoff that S foregoes if he
stops supervising. The expression at the right-hand side is the maximum that A is willing
to pay to avoid being monitored and reviewed. It reduces to aL 1 (1 2 a)Z if
equilibrium supervision is effective as in a type-(5) equilibrium, but A’s maximum
internal bribe is lower when supervision is ineffective (b*L 5 b*Z 5 1). Grouping the terms
in equation (6) yields
a@m~m*!b*L~pL 2 ~L 1 fL!! 2 ~1 2 b*L !L# 1 ~1 2 a!b*Z @m~m*! 1 ~1 2 m~m*!!r~r*!#
~pZ 2 ~Z 1 fZ!! 2 ~1 2 a!~1 2 b*Z!Z 2 c@r*~1 2 m~m*!! 1 m*# > 0, (7)
which is more useful for comparing ex-ante and ex-post collusion possibilities. There are
two collusion-proofness constraints for ex-post collusion because S may detect two types
of crimes: a bribe for a legal and a bribe for an illegal application. These constraints are:
pZ > Z 1 fZ (8)
for the case of an illegal application, and
pL > L 1 fL (9)
for the case of a legal application. Both constraints represent the same idea: to avoid
ex-post collusion, S’s reward must exceed the cost A incurs if S reports the bribe. I refer
to the case where both equations (8) and (9) fail as full ex-post internal corruption, as
opposed to partial ex-post internal corruption, which may occur when only equation (8)
or (9) fails. Observe that it is impossible to have full ex-post internal corruption if the
ex-ante collusion-proofness constraint (7) holds. This is intuitive, because if full collusion
ex-post were beneficial, S would collude ex-ante and avoid the supervision costs.
Consider now a star hierarchy that exhibits partial ex-post internal corruption, and
suppose that equations (7) and (8) hold but equation (9) does not. Note that
equation (7) may hold even though pL , L 1 fL provided that pZ is sufficiently high
and/or A is unlikely to receive a legal application (if a is low). Under these
conditions, ex-ante collusion may not be beneficial but S may prefer colluding with
A ex-post upon detection of the bribe L. Let X{[pL, L 1 fL] denote the internal bribe
from A to S if A is caught taking the bribe L. When the star hierarchy exhibits this
type of partial ex-post collusion, the equilibrium strategies are modified as follows: By
partial collusion, b*L 5 1. The monitoring effort m* is again determined through
equation (3) where the internal bribe X that S expects from A should replace pL,
whereas r* and b*Z are determined, respectively, through equations (4) and (2), as
context; obviously, internal corruption can be mitigated if these costs are sufficiently high. See Tirole (1992) for a
detailed discussion of this assumption in the analysis of collusion in organizations.
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before. Note that m* is now likely to be higher because X . pL, inasmuch as S
expects a higher private ‘‘reward’’ from monitoring. This indirectly increases the
probability of detecting both types of bribes, hence including the bribe on an illegal
application13 (recall that S will report such a bribe because equation (7) holds and
pZ . Z 1 fZ, as assumed). Casual observations suggest that partial ex-post collusion is
not uncommon. Supervisors may not report relatively ‘‘small’’ incidences of cor-
ruption, but instead they use the threat of it to capture a fraction of the subordi-
nate’s private surplus. Because partial ex-post collusion generates closer supervision,
interestingly it may even improve the efficiency of the system if the act of taking
bribes from legally qualified clients has minor social costs whereas the other crime,
which is now less likely to occur, has a potentially large social cost.
The second case of partial ex-post internal corruption is the opposite of the first:
Equations (7) and (9) hold while equation (8) fails. In terms of the parameters of
the model, this is likely to occur if a is close to one and/or pZ is relatively low with
respect to pL. Because pZ , Z 1 fZ, there is scope for a mutually beneficial agreement
according to which S receives a transfer from A for covering up a detected bribe. Let
Y { [pZ, Z 1 fZ] denote the size of this transfer. Equilibrium strategies under this
type of partial ex-post collusion are b*Z 5 1; m* is determined by equation (3) where
b*Z 5 1, whereas b*L and r* are determined, respectively, through equations (1) and
(4). Y replaces pZ in these conditions. Notice again that the incentives to monitor
and review are both enhanced by partial ex-post internal corruption. In the resulting
equilibrium, A is less likely to accept and S is more likely to detect a bribe from a
legal application.
Do better supervision technologies in the star hierarchy mitigate ex-ante internal
corruption? Consider an improvement in the monitoring and review technologies as a
shifting up of the m( z ) and r( z ) functions so that detection probabilities are uniformly
higher, or as a decrease in c, the marginal cost of supervision effort. The first-order
effects on equation (7) are, respectively,
ab*L~ pL 2 ~L 1 fL!! 1 ~1 2 a!b*Z~ pZ 2 ~Z 1 fZ!!~1 2 r! 1 cr (10)
for an increase in m, (1 2 a)b*Z(1 2 m)(pZ 2 (Z 1 fZ)) for an increase in r, and r(1 2
m) 1 m for a decrease in c. Hence, a reduction in c has an unambiguous, desirable effect
on internal corruption. Inspecting the other two first-order effects on equation (7)
reveals that if the rewards pL and pz are sufficiently high so that the organization does
not display full ex-post (hence, ex-ante) collusion, improving the supervision technologies
can only narrow the scope for ex-ante internal corruption. That is, in a collusion-free star
hierarchy better supervision technologies have unambiguously beneficial effects. Note,
however, that the sign of equation (10) is ambiguous when the hierarchy exhibits partial
ex-post internal corruption.
Improvements in the supervision technologies have no impact on the scope for
partial ex-post internal corruption. The conditions (8) and (9) depend only on rewards,
fines, and bribes. Therefore, the intention to reduce corruption through improvements
in supervision technologies may still be defeated by ex-post collusion; these simply may
be increasing the rents that S will capture by colluding with A ex-post. Furthermore, if the
13This result can be linked to a recent result by Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) in the context of optimal law
enforcement: Legalization of the less harmful acts (which corresponds here to allowing for partial ex-post collusion)
reduces the cost of deterring the greater harms (here, acceptance probability of an illegal application).
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improvements concern only the review technology, they may even convert a partial
ex-post collusion into full ex-ante collusion. To see this possibility, consider the first-order
effect (1 2 a)b*Z (1 2 m)(pZ 2 (Z 1 fZ)), which is negative if pZ , Z 1 fZ, i.e., if the partial
ex-post collusion constraint does not hold for the illegal application. Hence, a better
review technology may even reverse the sign of the expression in equation (7), from
positive to negative. The intuition is simple: When pZ , Z 1 fZ, increasing the proba-
bility of detecting a bribe for an illegal application also increases the weight of Z 1 fZ
2 pZ in the ex-ante net surplus from full collusion, and as a result this net surplus may
become positive.
Consider now the impact of fines on the scope for internal corruption. Section III has
shown that increasing the fines fL and fZ will reduce external corruption. But the
collusion-proofness constraints (7), (8), and (9) reveal that higher fines will unambig-
uously increase the risk of internal corruption, ex-ante and ex-post. In the noncooperative
equilibrium, A is less likely to accept bribes when fines are increased, which in turn
decreases the expected rewards from successful supervision. This means that it is easier
to bribe S for collusion. Because A is willing to pay more to avoid the potential higher
fines, the case for collusion is unambiguously stronger. This brief discussion on fines
generates important insights about two popular propositions on the prevention of
corruption. First, it is not true that higher sanctions will mitigate corruption; they may
even increase corruption by transforming its type from external to internal. Second, if,
as is often the case in the public service, the only sanction that can be imposed is
dismissal, we can reformulate this result as: Higher wages per se will reduce external
corruption but will increase the likelihood of internal corruption.
It should be clear that the safest instruments in fighting off corruption are the
rewards to successful supervision. High values of pL and pZ generate equilibria with
effective monitoring, review, and lower external corruption. Also, both ex-post and
ex-ante collusion-proofness constraints are more likely to hold under higher rewards,
thus the possibility of internal corruption can be completely eliminated. If pL and pZ are
fully flexible (which, unfortunately, hardly obtains in the case of public bureaucracies),
the good news is that no trade-off is involved in the combat against internal and external
types of corruption through the use of these instruments.
V. Separation of Review and Monitoring: The Hat Hierarchy
This section studies an alternative supervision procedure, which consists of a three-rank
hierarchy with three individuals, A, S, and R. The first supervisor S is now at the middle
rank of the hierarchy, and his task is limited to monitoring the bottom-rank agent A.
Review is performed by the second supervisor, denoted R (reviewer). I call this orga-
nization the hat hierarchy.
The game is as described in Section II, except that monitoring and review are done
separately by S and R. This separation presents a new possibility for the incentive system:
punishing S (and A, of course) if R uncovers an illegal application. I assume that the fine
fZ is imposed on both A and S if R demonstrates that an illegal application is accepted.
14
Recall that the review process cannot detect a bribe for a legal application.
Expected payoffs in the hat hierarchy are as follows. The expression for the bottom-
rank agent A’s payoff is as in the star hierarchy:
14This assumption is inconsequential to my results and economizes on notation. The reader may consider differ-
ential fines for A and S.
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EÛA 5 abL@L 2 m~m!~L 1 fL!# 1 ~1 2 a!bZ @Z 2 r~r!~Z 1 fZ!
2 m~m!~1 2 r~r!!~Z 1 fZ!# 1 wA.
R’s expected reward from reviewing is r(r)(1 2 a)(1 2 m(m))pZbZ ex-ante (at the outset
of the supervision game) and r(r)(1 2 a)pZbZ ex-post, (if S’s monitoring fails and R
receives the application). S has no incentive to misreport the outcome of his monitoring
if he does not collude with A. If S reports, he gets the reward pL or pZ; if his monitoring
fails, he approves and sends the application to R. R’s expected payoff in that stage
(ex-post) is
EÛR 5 r~r!~1 2 a! pZbZ 2 cr 1 wR,
and S’s expected payoff at the outset of the monitoring game is
EÛs 5 m~m!@abLpL 1 ~1 2 a!bZpZ# 2 ~1 2 m~m!!~1 2 a!bZr~r! fZ
2 cm 1 ws. (11)
The expected payoff in equation (11) shows that S’s monitoring incentives are stronger
in the hat hierarchy thanks to (1) the fine fZ for an illegal application that R may detect,
and (2) the fact that monitoring is now the only means by which S can obtain the reward
pZ (as opposed to monitoring and review in the star hierarchy). Hence, even if S is not
punished for A’s illicit behavior, S still has stronger incentives to monitor in the hat
hierarchy because of (2).
The noncooperative equilibrium is denoted {b̂L, b̂Z, m̂, r̂ }, where b̂L and b̂Z satisfy,
respectively, the conditions in equations (1) and (2), replacing ‘‘stars’’ by ‘‘hats.’’ The
strategies m̂ and r̂ satisfy
m9~m̂!@ab̂LpL 1 ~1 2 a!b̂Z~ pZ 1 r~ r̂! fZ!# 5 c, (12)
r9~ r̂!~1 2 a! pZb̂Z 5 c. (13)
As in the star hierarchy, keeping the assumption Z/fZ . L/fL, we have six potential types
of noncooperative equilibria, and all the comparative statics results in Propositions 1
and 2 on the effects of changes in rewards and fines carry over here. The following
proposition compares the two hierarchies.
PROPOSITION 3:15 Given an incentive scheme that does not generate internal corruption in the two
hierarchies, b*L Ä b̂L, b*Z Ä b̂Z, m* ¶ m̂, r* Ä r̂.
That is, monitoring is more intensive in the hat hierarchy than in the star hierarchy,
which in turn tends to partially crowd out the review effort. However, assuming away
internal corruption, expected external corruption is lower in the hat hierarchy. The
next section provides further comparative results by including the possibility of internal
corruption.
VI. Internal Corruption in the Hat Hierarchy
Internal corruption possibilities are slightly more complex in the hat hierarchy, owing
to the presence of a second supervisor. Ex-ante collusion is not beneficial if total
15The proof is available from the author upon request.
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expected equilibrium payoffs generated by supervision exceed the maximum that the
subordinates are willing to pay to avoid being supervised. Put in another way, the
expected size of the bribe that A will receive, aL 1 (1 2 a)Z, must not exceed the sum
of expected payoffs net of wages in the noncooperative equilibrium:
@EÛR 2 wR# 1 @EÛS 2 wS# 1 @EÛA 2 wA] Ä aL 1 (1 2 a)Z. (14)
Comparing the constraint in equation (14) with the collusion-proofness constraint in
the star hierarchy generates the following result:
PROPOSITION 4: There is wider scope for full (ex-ante) internal corruption in the hat hierarchy
than the star hierarchy.
PROOF: The expression of R’s expected payoff net of wR in the hat hierarchy is EÛR 2 wR 5
(1 2 m(m))[r(r)(1 2 a)pZbZ 2 cr]. EÛS 2 wS is given in equation (11), and the expression
of EÛA 2 wA is identical to EU*A 2 wA. Adding up the terms at the left-hand side of equation (14)
and comparing them with [EU*S 2 wS] 1 [EU*A 2 wA], shows that total expected payoffs in the
noncooperative equilibria of the hat hierarchy is lower than in the star hierarchy by (1 2
m(m))(1 2 a)bZr(r)fZ, which is the expected cost to S if an illegal application is detected by R.
The set of feasible equilibrium payoffs in the hat hierarchy is contained in the corresponding set for
the star hierarchy. Because the expected surplus to be shared through collusion is the same and equal
to aL 1 (1 2 a)Z, the fact that total expected payoffs is smaller in the hat hierarchy implies that
it displays a wider scope for full internal corruption.
Thus, as in the choice of fines, a trade-off is involved in the choice of the supervision
procedure. Separating the two supervision functions may reduce external corruption at
the higher risk of full ex-ante internal corruption.
Comparing the two hierarchies in terms of ex-post collusion possibilities is relatively
easy. When S detects a bribe for a legal application, he will report it if the reward pL
exceeds the maximum bribe A is willing to pay, i.e., if pL Ä L 1 fL, which is exactly the
corresponding condition (9) in the star hierarchy. If S successfully monitors A while
taking a bribe for processing an illegal application, by not reporting S foregoes the
reward pZ. Moreover he will be fined fZ if R detects and reports it. Thus, S will report
unless if he is paid at least pZ 1 r(r̂)fZ. But A’s willingness to pay to avoid being reported
is now (Z 1 fZ)(1 2 r(r̂)). Hence, the ex-post collusion-proofness constraint is
pZ 1 r~ r̂! fZ > ~Z 1 fZ!~1 2 r~ r̂!!. (15)
Comparing equations (8) and (15) reveals that a collusion between S and A upon
detection of an illegal application is less likely in the hat hierarchy. The separation of
review and monitoring plays the key role in this result. Equation (15) is more likely to
hold if the reward pZ is higher, if the review technology is better, and if the bribe Z is
small. The impact of fZ is ambiguous; if the detection probability in the review process
is high, increasing the fine fZ will reduce the surplus from a partial ex-post collusion
between S and A.
The last opportunity for ex-post collusion involves all three individuals, upon R’s
detection of an illegal application. R’s reward if he reports is again pZ, but A and S
together are willing to bribe R up to Z 1 2fZ. Hence,
pZ > Z 1 2fZ (16)
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must hold for R to report the illegal application. Comparing equations (16) and (8)
reveals that the case for ex-post collusion is stronger in the hat hierarchy when the illegal
application is uncovered during the review process.
PROPOSITION 5: Collusion between S and A upon S’s detection of a bribe for a legal application
is equally likely in both hierarchies. Ex-post collusion in the hat hierarchy (involving S and A) is
less likely than the star hierarchy if a bribe from an illegal application is detected by S in monitoring,
more likely (involving A, S and R) if it is detected by R in review.
The final set of results concerns the impact of improving supervision technologies on
the scope of ex-ante full internal corruption. As in the star hierarchy, a reduction in c
(supervision costs) narrows the scope for ex-ante collusion. Consider an increase in the
probability of detection at all effort levels. Substituting for the expressions in the
collusion-proofness constraint ¥i (EÛi 2 wi) Ä aL 1 (1 2 a)Z, i 5 A, S, R, an increase
in m generates the first-order effect
ab̂L@ pL 2 ~L 1 fL !# 1 ~1 2 a!b̂Z @~ pZ 1 rfZ! 2 ~1 2 r!~Z 1 fZ !#
2 @~1 2 a! pZ b̂Z r 2 cr̂#.
The first two terms above represent the first-order changes in the payoffs of A and S;
they are positive if the partial ex-post collusion-proofness constraints (9) and (15) hold.
The last term is nothing but R’s ex-post payoff (once he receives the application); it is
preceded by a negative sign because the bribe Z is now more likely to be detected by S
through the better technology, which reduces R’s ex-ante payoff. Combining the last two
terms, the first-order effect of an increase in m can be written as
ab̂L@pL 2 ~L 1 fL!# 1 ~1 2 a!b̂Z @~1 2 r!~pZ 2 ~Z 1 fZ !! 1 rfZ# 1 cr̂. (17)
As in the star hierarchy, when the rewards pL and pZ are too low, a better monitoring
technology can only increase the potential benefits from ex-ante collusion. Otherwise,
equation (17) is likely to be greater than equation (10) because of the additional term
rfZ. An improvement in the monitoring technology is likely to have a more favorable
effect on ex-ante collusion possibilities under the separated supervision procedure.
Intuitively, the better technology reduces the externality on S caused by introducing R
for the review. By increasing S ’s probability of detecting the bribe and being rewarded
(hence, decreasing the probability that S will be punished), the better monitoring
technology increases S ’s payoff in the noncooperative equilibrium. As a result, S is less
likely to participate in a collusive agreement under a better monitoring technology.
An improvement in the review technology has the first-order effect
~1 2 a!~1 2 m!b̂Z pZ 2 ~1 2 a!~1 2 m!b̂Z @Z 1 2fZ# (18)
on the scope for full ex-ante internal corruption. The first and the second terms in
equation (18) represent, respectively, the (first-order) increase in R’s payoff and the
decrease in A’s and S ’s combined payoffs. Payoffs at the bottom end of the hat hierarchy
are lower because A and S are now more likely to be punished for approving an illegal
application. Equation (18) can be written as
~1 2 a!~1 2 m!b̂Z @ pZ 2 ~Z 1 2fZ!#,
whose sign depends on the partial ex-post collusion constraint (16). An improvement in
the review technology increases the scope for full ex-ante internal corruption only if the
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hat hierarchy exhibits partial ex-post internal corruption. The wisdom often expressed in
popular fora, namely, that better review technologies mitigate corruption, is true
otherwise, only if ex-post collusion upon detection of an illegal application is not
beneficial. Proposition 6 below provides the comparison of the two hierarchies:
PROPOSITION 6:
1. Better supervision technologies or lower supervision costs have no impact on ex-post collusion
possibilities.
2. Lower supervision costs can eliminate the possibility of ex-ante internal corruption in both
hierarchies.
3. The impact of improving supervision technologies depends crucially on whether the hierarchy
displays partial ex-post collusion. A better monitoring (respectively, review) technology gener-
ating a higher probability of detection has a relatively more (respectively, less) favorable effect
on the scope for internal corruption in the hat hierarchy.
The potentially asymmetric effects of reductions in the cost of supervision effort and
increases in detection probabilities stem from their differential direct effects. The
first-order effect of lower supervision costs is to increase the payoff to the supervisor; the
first-order effect of a higher detection probability is more complex, as it also affects the
externality in the system. Replacing the supervisor with another whose cost of effort is
known to be lower has thus a more predictable, favorable effect than increasing
detection probabilities through improving the supervision technologies.
VII. Concluding Remarks
Klitgaart’s (1988, p. 75) formula, corruption 5 monopoly 1 discretion 2 accountabil-
ity, is perhaps the simplest display of the essentials about corruption. This paper has
assumed the monopoly problem and has studied the impact of supervision procedures
(which affect discretion and accountability) on the type, scope, and timing of corrup-
tion. Future research can pursue several directions from here. An important step ahead
is to endogenize the incentive scheme. One direction is to study alternative policies that
aim at breaking the bilateral (bureaucrat–client) monopolies in public bureaucracies.
This would require explicit modeling of clients’ decision making. The literature pro-
vides several conjectures about the impact of introducing competition among the
bureaucrats. A common conjecture is that competition will reduce bribes from legal
applications, but that the impact on illegal applications is ambiguous. It would be
interesting to see how policies that enhance competition for applications affect the
scope for internal corruption. Another extension is to allow for heterogeneous types
(honest/dishonest) of officials. Rose-Ackerman (1978) has shown that private informa-
tion about types is relevant for the impact of introducing competition because the
presence of dishonest officials may attract illegal applications.
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